A Critical Overview of Ghana's Petroleum Revenues Management Bill 2010

As Ghana gears towards ‘first oil,’ 15 December to be exact, its law and policy-makers scramble to create legal regimes designed to stand the test of time and set Ghana (unlike its African counter-parts) towards the non-resource curse path. To achieve this end, the government and its policy advisors over the past year have intrigued the populace with an array of policy options, some designed to provoke public debate, others clearly not, but all with the hope of pointing the country towards a prudent and well-managed natural resource sector. Included in this list of policy alternatives is the design of a revenue management regime for the country’s nascent petroleum sector. As well as a thoughtful and well conceived licensing regime and contractual basis, the management of natural resources like Greek columns should ideally be supported by concrete revenue provisions.

It is on this background that the Petroleum Revenues Management Bill (PRMB) was recently put before the Ghanaian Parliament’s Select Committee on Mines and Energy. Unlike its sister, the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Bill 2010, the PRMB has sparked tremendous controversy and public opinion, not least because at the heart of the PRMB lies its core aim, that is how revenues accruing from the petroleum rents would be managed and allocated. So far buzz words are determining the agenda; “no to collateral,” “yes to Collateral,” “public accountability,” “transparency.” Buzz words, it seems, that have left the general populace mystified by the whole process. A general note to a friend recently ended with “so what is the situation on ground like in Ghana at the moment?” His reply, “Oh, cloud-cuckoo land mostly!” Cloud cuckoo land indeed!

To bring us all back from the brink of cloud-cuckoo land, it would perhaps be prudent to take a detailed glance at the Bill section by section to ascertain some major areas that might be of concern, and where a close scrutiny, it is presumed, might offer a discerning and more informed public discourse. As one author posited in the renowned publication by Joseph Stiglitz and co, in Escaping the Resource Curse, a “resource dependent economy, the magnitude of [resource] receipts, and the difficulties of control suggest the need for [a] special legislation directed to the particular problems posed by such revenues.” The publication is designed to offer a comprehensive analysis of essential aspects needed in any forward looking revenues management law, a sort of best practices manual so to speak. The authors’ focal point is to ascertain how governments can structure their laws so as to build effective revenue management institutions. In comparing the recommendations from various such publications and looking at particular country specific case studies, this note is intended to share with the reader international best practice models in relations to analysing the strength and deficiencies in the current PRMB. My findings therefore are as follows:

First glance of the PRMB makes a good read. Overall the "PRMB" makes a fair attempt at covering all the necessary provisions needed for a nascent oil and gas industry, while at the same time attempting (though in some cases not succeeding) to pay attention to a Country specific design, that is, not being viewed as a copy-paste publication. However novel this attempt is, the novelty wears out when one discovers a seemingly novel Bill that lacks in some parts Greek columns to hold them up. That is, there were certain best practice provisions that, without having to employ the copy-paste design, were either missing or frankly vague at best. So let’s take a step by step approach in analysing the provisions of the Bill as it stands.

1. Given the central importance of Oil Revenues, the management, transparency, the protection of oil funds may be enhanced by the establishment of separate segregated accounts: SECTION 2(1) of the Bill does so by first establishing the Petroleum Account, a general account to be designated at the Bank of Ghana which receives and disburses Petroleum Revenues due to the Country (including royalties, profit oil share, income taxes, participation funds and any other amounts related). Best practice stipulates that such a fund should be generally utilised predominantly for development funding. For a developing country (or as some would prefer, emerging economy) such projects would include the improvement of healthcare, infrastructure development, access to education, investment in non-resource based sectors and so on.

SECTION 10 (1) (2) establishes the Ghana Petroleum Funds, a general fund serving two purposes. First, it provides for a Stabilisation Fund, revenues from which are used only to restore budgetary imbalances, during times of fluctuating or low oil prices and or crises. Essentially when prices are high often times spending increases due to increased rents; when prices are low, however, such high spending cannot be sustained. This results in a stop-go form of development, the resulting effect being increased pressures to borrow, providing evidence as to why majority of resource rich countries become heavily indebted. Such a fund, thus, with its annual spending limits, is designed to avoid this problem since the formulas act to smooth expenditures even during periods of significant price fluctuations. Second, it provides for a Heritage Fund, a generational fund so to speak. Due to the non-renewable status of Petroleum resources, the Heritage Fund is designed for future generations as a revenue source when oil resources ran out. Without having to spell it out clearly, these provisions provide the back-backbone for a strong Bill.

2. In general one would expect the definition of revenue to be as comprehensive as possible. SECTION 6 makes such provisions. The definition of revenues in the section encompasses oil receipts, rents, government participation and so on. Another strong provision in the sense that, items not included in the general definition of the term would ideally be left out, creating avenues for revenue haemorrhaging, the first tell tale signs of corruption.

3. So far the bells of transparency have been ringing, another buzz word thrown around for public sentiment, but rarely ever explained. Transparency? Where? Are we discussing contract transparency? or is transparency a general term, thrown in because it sounds great and complies with international best practice? The Bill approaches transparency in several manners, mostly not clothed in the language of transparency but essentially achieving the same end. The first is designed to tackle the issue of transparency at the terminalling point, that is, at the point where funds are received to the account. To enhance transparency and to avoid possible diversion or delay, payments to the general account which receives the Petroleum revenues are stipulated to be made by transfer directly into the account by the entity bearing the payment obligation. SECTION 3 to that effect stipulates that the Petroleum Revenue assessed as due in each month shall be paid by DIRECT TRANSFERS into the Petroleum Account... Now considering the need for high levels of accountability and transparency a stronger provision would envisage payments to the account only by means of ELECTRONIC transfer so as to avoid cash-in-hand situation, yet another avenue for corruption. Electronic transfers enhance transparency as no physical monies passes through the bureaucratic arms of government or individual players. NOTE: The PRMB does not make provision for transfer by ELECTRONIC means, merely that it should be by DIRECT TRANSFER...Clearly this provision must be strengthened to state specifically ELECTRONIC.

4. While ordinary accounts may be subject to electronic transfer orders simply from the Central Bank, an oil account requires a more formal structure to provide protection where institutions are not strongly and deeply entrenched (such is the case in Ghana). In the Sao Tome and Principe case, for example, (which provides an excellent backdrop since in part the PRMB was modelled after Sao Tome’s), signatures of four officials from different government departments are required on withdrawal orders. Additionally in the Sao Tome example, it is even possible to delay the time between the withdrawal requests to actual receipt of funds outside the designated account. The present PRMB makes no such provisions, as such whereas strong transparency language may have provided a backdrop, the so called tooth needed to back up the seemingly strong animal is essentially missing.

5. It is also vital that any such revenue management regime provides mechanisms that deal with payments of the expenses relating to the funds as they are. These would include Custodial Charges, Payments of Investments Advisors, Transaction Charges and Possible Refunds (for instance, where over-payments have been made). In principle and practically, these are essential for a number of reasons. As the old saying goes, a job well paid is a job well done. This mantra is even more relevant in the Petroleum sector. A comprehensive detail of a compensation mechanism and the treatment of expenses for those to whom the country entrust its resource revenues seem only too natural. SECTION 9 addresses the expenses of the Bank of Ghana, who according to the PRMB is charged with the day-to-day management of the Petroleum Funds.

Now another buzz item in the news recently has been whether Ghana should vest such funds in-house or direct them to a Custodial institution outside the country. Though the author has opinions on this matter it seems an issue that deserves to be treated in much greater detail and therefore beyond the scope of this piece. However, in our present case, unless the Bank of Ghana has been known in the past or currently to have been mismanaged and or be corrupt, the author sees no reason, in this regard, to simply copy and paste international best practices.

6. A further control which might or might not be included in the instructions to the Custodial institution is the limit to which funds are to be transferred from the general account to the budget. International best practice would suggest a single annual withdrawal. Though this is one of the cases in which Country specific circumstances might stipulate different treatment. In Norway for example, there is no cap as such, withdrawals from the Oil Fund are set equal to the deficit in the budget, and the build-up of the permanent fund depends solely on annual discretionary decisions regarding the budget. The Saotomean Law establishes a limit by setting a single annual withdrawal to a certain percentage. The appropriate choice for Ghana would require country specific determinants. Setting a cap or limit to on annual withdrawals ensures over-spending is avoided; though another justification might be made for the Norwegian path and would suggest that for a developing country like Ghana where often budgetary deficits are common, flexibility should be the ultimate goal, a more flexible regime might be required to meet changes in annual spending patterns. Once again a very careful analysis keeping abreast of the situation on ground is ideal to drawing the best conclusions. As it currently stands the PRMB.

SECTION 19, attempt at addressing these concerns in sub-sections 1 and 2 which stipulate that “Beginning the year 2011, the Annual Budget Funding Amount from petroleum revenues shall be set within the range of fifty to seventy percent of the Benchmark Revenue…. The exact percentage of the Benchmark Revenue which shall be adopted as the Annual Budget Funding Amount shall vary from year to year guided by a medium-term development strategy aligned with a long-term development framework, the economy’s absorptive capacity and the need for prudent macroeconomic management.” It seems in this case the framers of the Bill attempted a middle-ground solution, where, though for the year 2011 the funding from the petroleum revenues accrued to the budget is limited to a range of 50 – 70% benchmark revenue, the Bill attempts flexibility for the determination of annual revenues to the budget from the petroleum account in the subsequent years: a fusion it seems of the Norwegian and Sao-Tome examples. A stronger provision would however attempt at creating flexibility even with the limits for the succeeding years.

7. Additionally a PRM Law must specify restrictions as to areas of use. Again, this follows the trend of international best practice. SECTION 22 makes such provisions, spending from the Petroleum Revenues are restricted to certain areas, including: agriculture, human resource development, infrastructure, and so on. Ideally, the trend should follow a national development plan, and or poverty reduction strategy, such as the case in Sao Tome, though the Sao Tome provisions are broad and make no specific arrangement for sectoral allocations. On the other hand, the Alaskan model of direct distribution to citizens should be avoided. A direct distribution plan “would work only if it were managed in ways that are uncharacteristic of most-rich developing country governments,” a main characteristic of which is the rent-seeking behaviour, which in the case of direct distribution would be shifted from government to citizens. One consequence of such a model would be to encourage large-scale migration, where new immigrants try to enter to benefit from such rents. The Alaskan model works in a sense because harsh weather conditions and the cost of moving has shielded Alaska and prevented large-scale migration from other U.S States. Therefore in the Alaska case, direct distribution is justifiable since on an annual basis there exists high predictability in population trends.

8. A PRM Law must also provide a clear governance structure covering the main oil fund asset management functions: that is, an Investment Policy, Selection and Oversight of Investment Managers, Selection of Custodial Institution. Coupled with lucid mandates these management functions should include a compensation policy and governance rules for oversight committees. SECTION 31 - 38, of the PRMB addresses rules governing the investment committee and its functions. SECTION 42 addresses the oversight and reporting of the Committee.

9. The Minister of Finance in particular plays a key role in the management of the Petroleum revenues. This includes his role in advising or approving investment decisions with the operational management of revenues delegated to the Central Bank, pursuant to a Management Agreement. The Minister of Finance’s duties will amount to general overseer of petroleum revenues, and his functions should amount to no less than a co-trustee. SECTION 26-27 makes provisions for these functions.

10. Furthermore, an oil revenue Law should limit an oil funds investment to certain secure and non-speculative instruments. SECTION 29 of the BILL deals with such provisions. Note, however, that the Ghana BILL does not stipulate the prohibition of investment within the country. Doing so would help limit political influence in the funds choice of investment. SECTION 5 does, however, prohibit borrowing against Oil revenues, a provision which is currently vulnerable. Basic understanding of the issue is being clouded by emotional sentiment and not necessarily prudent assessment. Simply put, by collateralising Oil revenues, the country will be setting itself up for vulnerability during hard times. For instance, in times of high oil prices it might seem agreeable to borrow heavily and vest much of that against the countries oil revenues, save for the fact that oil prices are highly volatile, this essentially means when prices drop as they have done time and time again, our spending patterns change, hence, the need for a stabilization fund (discussed above) during such times to balance the budget during the shortfall. Collateralising vests future revenues in the hands of lenders meaning that in times of hardship there will be no alternate avenue for fall-back, such that to give credibility to continued developmental projects which have the consequence of annual budget increases, the country would continue to borrow until borrowing can no longer be sustainable. Now this is a cycle can be avoid. A clear prohibition on borrowing against oil revenues is the surest way to avoid such a mishap.

11. Given the significance of oil revenues and the limitations on existing institutions, it may also be desirable to consider the establishment of additional oversight groups, especially groups that encompass the ideal of public participation, including civil society and other stakeholders, elements not represented in government. SECTION 53-59 authorises the establishment of the "Public Interest and Accountability Committee" (another provision currently under parliamentary attack). This section has come a long way from its infancy to its current state, the committee has shifted from being envisioned as a simple advisory body to an entity tasked with oversight duties, providing yet another avenue for custodial oversight. To be more effective, however, the Committee should be accorded decision-making powers or be conferred influential powers with regard to the direction of Petroleum revenues investment. Without such decision-making powers such a body can easily be overlooked.

12. Internal, External and Independent Auditing is covered by SECTION 46-50. Such auditors provide additional oversight but outside the ambit of government and public sector control. Their independence therefore must be assured. A detail stipulation of auditor independence is therefore essential.

13. No provisions are made in the current Bill for private pronouncement of rights or Judicial Controls. It is important that the roles of all arms of government are stipulated in the Bill. This includes the Judiciary and the limits of their powers, if any. Legal Sanctions are, however, provided for under SECTION 61.

14. Overall, the transparency provisions are much too vague and although section on ministerial discretion for determination of confidentiality was rectified (ministerial discretionary powers have been limited, to the extent that confidentiality may not be declared without Parliamentary approval), it seems overall the transparency features of the Bill are vague at best. A clear separation of items that might fall under the determination of confidential should be highlighted and like-wise items that do not fall under-confidentiality should be stipulated to further curb discretionary powers and limit opportunities to over-use such discretionary powers. SECTION 51 sets the transparency agenda.

Slight "Qualification" On An Earlier Note!

Okay so I was a little perturbed after reading Moyo's book. But it seams in fact my frustration at Moyo's peace did not exist in a vacuum, it seems even Jeffrey Sachs (if you don't know him google him), sympathises with my frustration. In a recent conference held at St. Andrews, Scotland (of which I attended), he was equally disturbed by the sudden disregard for the good AID has done, citing various developmental projects that have in fact helped alleviate the devastating effects of poverty. To that end, my basic disconnect from Moyo's peace still stands...

This is where I may slightly modify my stance, my previous comments again as a recap:

Perhaps her most daring statement was that "the Chinese are our friends." Reading these few lines my skin flinches and I start to develop this allergic reaction, on close examination I come to find that I am allergic to the juxtaposition of the words "the Chinese are our friends," in explaining Africa's current economic relationship with China. This seems to me more hypocritical than any, amid the shameful acts of human rights abuse in Africa supported by no less than Chinese arms dealing and transference of power play from the West to the Far East, Ms. Moyo seems to think that somehow China would be much kinder to us than their Western counterparts? Where is this proof? But obviously in interviews where this question is raised she shrugs of this genuine concern with once again this idea that Africa is a supposed equal partner and "open to all." If the Dalai Lama's refusal of visa to South Africa (for the fear that China may reverse it funding for the World Cup games) does not ring a disturbing bell in one's ears I would not know what will, perhaps we shall finally wake up when all our currency reads "made in China."

First of all, the Chinese are in no way responsible for our Human Rights abuses, responsibility lies solely with our leaders and our leaders alone...NOTE, however, that if weapons are supplied by the Chinese to aid in any such acts of abuse, or where their association with despots emboldens them to continue acts of human disregard, THAT, I have a problem with (and this goes for the West as well as the Chinese).

Secondly, "the Chinese are our friends," I still flinch at this slightly naive interpretation of economic partnership, that's unless Moyo actually meant it as a form of sarcasm, then I would understand. The crucks of the matter is as follows, The Chinese are interested in economic expansion, this means conquering new markets and forming economic partnerships world-wide, this is especially so with resource rich countries. Purely strategic moves designed to secure Chinese economic dominance and ensure energy security. This is not EVIL, no it's actually what every country aims for. These interests need not be mutually exclusive to Africa's interest for the simple fact that the Chinese need what we have (i.e. natural resources) and they have what we need (i.e. cash money and lots of it). I do still stand by this phrase "Moyo seems to think that somehow China would be much kinder to us than their Western counterparts? Where is this proof?" Indeed there is absolutely no proof, but this is besides the point. Ultimately, where the West and East compete for our resources we are the resultant winners; there should be a slight caveat here, which is, if we notice this competition and act in our best interest to get the best deal out of it....START WITH SMART NEGOTIATION SKILLS.

In conclusion, I still don't want to wake up one day to find "made in China" on my currency, but Chino-African relations hardly needs to be painted in such simple terms for the relationship is more complicated and intricate than we might at first assume. In this modern age, any African government that allows its resources to be hijacked by Western or Eastern interests can hardly cry the good old song of NEO-COLONIALISM.

Human Rights: Law or Just Statements of Aspiration?

One of the purposes of the United Nations as stated in its Charter is to “promote and encourage respect for human rights,”[i] thereby instilling a legal obligation on member States to do all possible to ensure the achievement of the goals. Thus, the assumption that human rights are statements of aspirations and not law does not reflect the purposes of the Charter, or the developments of HR law over the past 50 years.[ii] The result of decades of human rights activism and campaign has led to an increasing amount of State ratification of HR treaties and compliance.[iii] On the other hand viewing human rights merely as law equally does little justice to the non-judicial mechanisms of human rights enforcement.[iv]

HR law, however, as a component of international law is gripped by the same inconsistencies as those that lie in the system of international law. Namely; that States sovereignty still plays a vital role[v], a flaw which has allowed even State parties to human rights treaties to systematically violate them[vi] without reasonable redress. For the system to be more efficient HR monitors need to address these concerns.[vii]

Although the impact of treaties and special procedures has elevated the status of the individual as actor,[viii] the HR machine has only slightly breached the levee of State sovereignty[ix]. This fault lies with the inability of HR to adequately tackle the issues of treaty breach, leading to countries being rewarded for positions rather than effects, the result being that “governments can take the positions that they do not honour and benefit from doing so.”[x]

Moreover the argument that even though there are no adequate enforcement capabilities governments still feel compelled to perform what is requested of them[xi] is not a sufficient enough reasoning for the maintenance of the status quo. This view also fails to consider the instances where a States may not feel compelled to act as is required, and unfortunately there are too many of such instances.[xii]

Some have proposed a European-like court system[xiii] in replacement of the Human Rights Council, with the view that States will no longer be given the discretion to implement HR’s.[xiv] This is a worthy approach but does not come without critique. The European system falls under a backdrop of regional integration. Majority of the European states are aligned with strong liberal democracies.[xv] The proposal of such a system on an international level (though not impossible) would require a heavy dose of state agreement. In our European example the European Union was the incentive for signature onto the European Convention on Human Rights. How would this quid-pro quo system work on the international level?

Perhaps the increase in regional judicial bodies is the answer.[xvi] However, where you have regional institutions, those States who are not members of regional blocks[xvii] risk exclusion. If the idea is that HR’s are a “basic requirements in any society and a pre-requisite for human progress and development,”[xviii] then limiting the call for universal rights to regional institutions will not suffice.

The protective roles of national human rights institutions (NHR’s) have also been duly welcomed.[xix] Internal independent bodies have proved to be “one of the more promising developments in global efforts to uphold human rights.”[xx] But as is with its international counterpart NHRI’s have often been dubbed “toothless bulldogs” because majority of them are created without the vital enforcement mechanisms.[xxi]

Europe has proved that HR institutions can be successful and even more so addressed the notion that HR’s are not merely inspirational goals. The United Nations treaty bodies continue to establish ground breaking mechanisms for state compliance,[xxii] (Bleir v Uraguay[xxiii]). To a large extent the “shame” mechanism has gotten State attention. However, in the long run the achievement of universal human rights as envisaged by the Charter cannot be based on such uncertain grounds. Helfer and Slaughter argue that the Human Rights Council places itself under the tutelage of the ECtHR to develop tools necessary for an effective supranational adjudicative body.[xxiv] I propose this, but also an amalgamation of all the other suggestions.

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[i] United Nations Charter Art. 1(3), also see: Art. 56, 62, 68 and 76

[ii] The very development of treaty law in human rights field can hardly be ignored. Human rights remains the only area of law whose treaties have been ratified by all States in the world

[iii] See for instance: Oyama v California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), the application of UN Charter Art. 55 and 56

[iv] Koh, Harold ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’ Addison C. Harris Lecture, 1998, “they are enforced through a complex, little-understood legal process that I call the transnational legal process”

[v] Delbruek, Jost ‘International Protect of Human Rights and State Sovereignty’ Indiana Law Review, vol.57 (fall ’82), p.g. 567-78

[vi] Neumayer, Eric, ‘Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, (May 1, 2005), p.g. 6. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=607681 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.607681

[vii] Helfer and Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ Yale Law Journal, vol.107 p.g. 273, (1997)

[viii] See: The Ad-hoc tribunals on the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

[ix] Traisbach, Knut (2006) Reframing Human Rights III ‘The Individual in International Law’ [Workshop] p.g. 1

[x] Hathaway, Oona A.,Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal, vol. 111, 2002, p.g. 1941; Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=311359

[xi] Weissbrodt and La Vega (2007)‘International Human Rights Law: An Introduction’ University of Pennsylvania Press, p.g. 251

[xii] Examples include, Iran, China, Russia, Sudan, Iraq, DRC

[xiii] European Convention on Human Rights (1950)

[xiv] See: Art.2 Optional Protocol on Economic Social and Political Rights

[xv] Helfer and Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ Yale Law Journal, vol.107 p.g. 274

[xvi] Conference of Ministers of Justice/Attomey General on the Establishment of an African-Court on Human

and Peoples' Rights, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 12 December, 1997, Draft Protocol to the Afiican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.

[xvii] Either not signed to the documents establishing a regional body, or is by some form of geographical anomaly not integrated within a community

[xviii] Secretary General “Talks Open in Addis Ababa on Establishing African Human Rights Court. DEUTSCHE

PRESSE-AGENTUR, December 12. 1997. available in LEXJS. News Ubrary. Curnws Rle.”

[xix] The Paris Principles, Resolution 1992/54 of 1992 and General Assembly, Resolution 48/134 of 1993

[xx] Ramcharan, Bertrand (2003) ‘The Protection Role of National Human Rights Institutions’ Leiden, Boston, p.g. vii

[xxi] Ramcharan, Bertrand (2003) ‘The Protection Role of National Human Rights Institutions’ Leiden, Boston, p.g. 43...see: The Ghana Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, and the Fiji Human Rights Commission as illustrative on this point

[xxii] Art. 2 Optional Protocol to Economic Social and Political Rights, the procedure for individual complaint

[xxiii] Bleir v Uraguay, 30/1978 (R.7/30)...Human Rights Council individual complaint hearing

[xxiv] Helfer and Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ Yale Law Journal, vol.107 p.g. 273, (1997)

Charles Taylor; Innocent Until Proven Guilty? Maybe..

On July 14th former President of Liberia Charles Taylor took to a seat to defend himself from Charges of "war crimes" and other "crimes against humanity." A trial set by the Special Court of Sierra Leon (SCSL), held at the Hague. Mr. Taylor, before the trial started (on January 7th 2008) and until now still maintains his innocence (as many defendants in such cases usually do). I have just a few thoughts on this trial and of the man in general but perhaps it is important for those who do not know very much about the case to give just a brief background on the case and on International Law (what I dub IL) in general.

Just briefly on why there is a "Special Court" at all to begin with. International Law has come a long way, from the pre-world war II era where the only major actors at the IL stage were States, hence, sovereignty was the rule of the day..along with Sovereignty came state immunity (which still exists by the way), along with State immunity comes Sovereign immunity, i.e. one State cannot prosecute another State or State representative for a crime (quite different with civil cases which is not at all the case at hand, maybe we shall discuss international civil law later). Essentially, things (as they usually do with the evolution of reason) began to change post-world war II. The War was vital I would say in helping humanity see how far human cruelty can extend. A major reason being the fact that war was not as primitive as it used to be, now there is such things as mas weapons, extremely destructive machinery designed to cause nothing more than mass extermination and human grief.

The Nuremberg trails post war offered the first most realistic trial against State officials for crimes committed while in office, such crimes (now known as war crimes and crimes against humanity are now stipulated in the Geneva Conventions). The veil of Sovereignty could no longer be used as an excuse (or at least it seemed)...More and more advocates of "equality, fair treatment, and the ban on the use of force" came forward, and in the early 50's and onwards these advocates seemed more to be newly independent States vying for equal status on the world stage, this was mostly evident in the signing of and ratification of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties where a clause in it stipulated that no treaty would override a peremptory norm or "jus cogens" (a norm which is of universal application, e.g. banning of torture) such a treaty would be void...believe it or not these new independent States with the help of the Soviet Union really fought hard for such status (as at that time it was in their vital interest). So since then of course, not only have peremptory norms been held to higher a standard, (many say they are in fact the highest source of IL) but anyone who violates them are subject to be prosecuted on the international scene. An area which received more attention was the law related to conduct during war and the treatment of civilians especially during these times..bringing with it those human right norms and the striking down (at least for the most part) the veil of sovereignty. Through these laws, individuals have been elevated as key players on the international stage, depending on what kind of individual you are this could be a great deal or something extremely annoying (tell that to Charles Taylor). Coming with this is the notion of "individual criminal responsibility" which holds those responsible for these crimes to account, there is no longer a protection of the State behind the individual. The Rwandan and former Yugoslav trials, paved way for what is now the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court, and later after the atrocities during the Sierra Leonian war the Special Court of Sierra Leon was created, a hybrid court designed to mix local and international law to try perpetrators of those atrocities.

So we fast forward to Taylor, he was arrested in 2006 by Nigerian security forces while trying to cross the border (during his exile in Nigeria...the cheek of him). He did this knowing that there had been an indictment in 2003 by the SCSL, charging the former leader with "Crimes against humanity and war crimes." Anyway, he was handed over to the Sierra Leonian court but later upon several debates transferred to the Hague upon fears that his presence in Sierra Leon would cause security issues.

The crimes he faces include:

• Five counts of war crimes: terrorizing civilians, murder, outrages on personal dignity, cruel treatment, and looting;

• Five counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape, sexual slavery, mutilating and beating, and enslavement; and

• One count of other serious violations of international humanitarian law: recruiting and using child soldiers.

Now you are wondering how ONE person could have possibly committed all these crimes, well see this is the exciting thing about international criminal law, in that, the person who actually committed the crime need not be the one on trial (although he/she could) but his superiors who actually ordered those crimes are held to be as criminally responsible as the principle perpetrators, that is, without those direct controls (especially in a military settings) such crimes may not ( or may) have been committed, basically no head of State can get away for ordering genocide for instance, even though he played no part in the actual killings..Novel is it not? Hmm..not really

The evidence against Taylor in my view is quit solid. According to the prosecutor, he was responsible for planning, instigating and and ordering them and he even went further in aiding and abetting by supplying the weapons needed by the Rebels in Sierra Leon to commit those crimes. There is strong evidence that Taylor had strong ties with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) who was allied with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a force in Sierra Leon whose leaders have also been indicted by the Court. In 2003, a shoot-out occurred after the indictment between Liberian forces (Taylor's) and the RUF which killed its leader Bockarie, evidence points to the fact that Taylor needed him "gone" after all he would probably testify against him later on...hmmm. "Why the hell is Taylor meddling in Sierra Leonian affairs" you might as, does the word DIAMOND ring a bell ??

The prosecution so far has brought 91 witnesses, no less victims in themselves who have experienced anything from rape to mutilation and professionals who have brought their own evidence from Sierra Leon. It has been incumbent on the prosecution not just to show that atrocities occurred but also the vital link between those forces who committed the atrocities and Taylor, like any criminal case, this vital link needs to be proven without any reasonable doubt, unfortunately for the prosecution the witnesses linking forces with Taylor were far less than those showcasing the trauma victims went through. But is this a bad thing? After all "quantity is not quality," for it seems the prosecution is trying to prove that Taylor's relationship with Sankoh leader of RUF started long before Taylor became president at a meeting in Lybia in the 80's, where they both professed their undying love for each other..just kidding, but at least there is evidence that they did at an early stage promise to help each other, of which it seems Taylor kept up his half of the bargain. One stick in the mud though is that there is no evidence of Taylor actually having been to Sierra Leon, but then again in modern times communications might prove enough to establish responsibility.

So anyway, he (Taylor) decides to take to the stage and profess his innocence by stating that he has always been a "humanitarian" (not in his exact words but "all my life trying to pursue justice" does not fall far from the tree). He claimed he was rather a "peace-maker," he would have been superman to try to control Liberia and Sierra Leon at the same time...hmm, I beg to differ, Hitler was no super man and he controlled many European States (of course this was before his demise). Moreover, diamond money can surely get someone to feel like superman, so frankly I don't buy it. And I wonder why he spends his time saying that he tried to fix the war torn country (Sierra Leon) when his own country was no better (at the time) than Sierra Leon, I guess the old saying "take the stick out of your own eye before you point to another's" was not resounding in his ears during his "humanitarian" days.

Despite my obvious disdain for the guy, as they say "one is innocent until proven guilty." This means that I am willing to indulge his defence of "these are lies" "these are lies," although, if I was his lawyer, I would plead with him to either not speak or quit saying that the prosecution is lying as his ONLY evidence, for that can only take one so far, legally it means jack (or jill whichever rocks your boat). So while I do not (and oh how I wish I did) have all the evidence in front of me, I will trust in the positive role that the special court is playing in restoring some level of justice to people whose lives have been all but taken away without any apologies.

For those who wing and whine, with the usual "why are westerners after African leaders?" (with my response being blah blah blah), I say to them refer back to my earlier brief but hopefully concise history of this kind of International Law. It was advocated for by us, yes us, our leaders on the verge of independence advocated for this kind of justice..and no, it is not a shame that those that kill, torture, maim, rape, commit genocide are brought to justice, what is a shame is that we even have to debate about it. If Charles Taylor is innocent and if there is apparently no evidence against him, then I am sure that he will be exonerated, if not then oh well, he will await his fate, but to do nothing at all proves nothing, we are not a people who lavish in the glory of injustice. Let us not forget that the Special Court for Sierra Leon bares its name because it is commissioned by the Sierra Leonian people and governed mainly by the law of Sierra Leon with the help of International criminal proceedings. So all the nay sayers of justice, I say to you...well, I actually have not much to say to you.

At this point all I have to say is, when the heck are we going to have Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, my skin is itching from the long wait.